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Background: It is often assumed that evolution takes place on very large timescales. Countering this assumption,
rapid evolutionary dynamics are increasingly documented in biological systems, e.g. in the context of predator–prey
interactions, species coexistence and invasion. It has also been shown that rapid evolution can facilitate the
evolution of cooperation. In this context often evolutionary dynamics influence population dynamics, but in spatial
models rapid evolutionary dynamics also emerge with constant population sizes. Currently it is not clear how well
these spatial models apply to species in which individuals are not embedded in fixed spatial structures. To address
this issue we employ an agent-based model of group living individuals. We investigate how positive assortment
between cooperators and defectors and pay-off differences between cooperators and defectors depend on the
occurrence of evolutionary dynamics.
Results: We find that positive assortment and pay-off differences between cooperators and defectors differ when
comparing scenarios with and without selection, which indicates that rapid evolutionary dynamics are occurring in
the selection scenarios. Specifically, rapid evolution occurs because changes in positive assortment feed back on
evolutionary dynamics, which crucially impacts the evolution of cooperation. At high frequencies of cooperators
these feedback dynamics increase positive assortment facilitating the evolution of cooperation. In contrast, at low
frequencies of cooperators rapid evolutionary dynamics lead to a decrease in assortment, which acts against the
evolution of cooperation. The contrasting dynamics at low and high frequencies of cooperators create positive
frequency-dependent selection.
Conclusions: Rapid evolutionary dynamics can influence the evolution of cooperation in group-living species and
lead to positive frequency-dependent selection even if population size and maximum group-size are not affected
by evolutionary dynamics. Rapid evolutionary dynamics can emerge in this case because sufficiently strong
selective pressures allow evolutionary and demographic dynamics, and consequently also feedback between
assortment and evolution, to occur on the same timescale. In particular, emerging positive frequency-dependent
selection could be an important explanation for differences in cooperative behaviors among different species with
similar population structures such as humans and chimpanzees.Background
It is commonly assumed that evolution only takes place on
very large timescales that include hundreds or thousands
of generations. In contrast to this assumption, an increas-
ing number of studies document evolutionary dynamics
that occur over just a handful of generations. Well known
examples include beak evolution in Darwin finches [1],
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orchanges in predator–prey cycles due to algae evolution in
response to predation by rotifers [3,4]. An important obser-
vation in these studies was that evolutionary dynamics
were so fast that they occurred on the same timescale as
ecological dynamics, e.g. population dynamics. This opens
up the possibility that rapid evolutionary dynamics emerge,
i.e. that evolutionary and ecological dynamics feed back on
each other on the same timescale. For instance in the case
of Darwin’s finches it has been shown that population dy-
namics were not only driven by changes in food supply
and density-dependence but also by evolutionary changes
in beak size and shape [1]. Several theoretical and empiricaltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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and invasion [1,5-12] have shown that the kinds of feedback
dynamics that emerge between evolutionary and ecological
dynamics can crucially depend on whether evolutionary
and ecological dynamics occur on the same timescale.
Rapid evolutionary dynamics can be also important for
the evolution of cooperation if evolutionary dynamics
affect demographic dynamics. In this context cooperators
are individuals who provide benefits to others at some cost
to themselves. In contrast, defectors are individuals who
do not engage in such cooperative behavior, which allows
them to obtain benefits from cooperators while avoiding
costs to themselves. It has been shown that the evolution
of cooperation can be enhanced if evolutionary dynamics
affect group or population sizes [13,14]. Additionally, en-
hancement of the evolution of cooperation due to rapid
evolutionary dynamics is also possible when group size and
population size are not affected by evolutionary dynamics.
In spatial models where population size and number of
interaction partners are fixed, evolutionary dynamics can
still impact demographic dynamics and changes in demo-
graphic dynamics can subsequently feed back on evolution-
ary dynamics [15-18]. Evolutionary dynamics can impact
demographic dynamics because fitness differences among
individuals directly translate into differential reproduction
among individuals. The reverse (that demographic dynam-
ics influence evolutionary dynamics) arises because demo-
graphic dynamics influence the spatial distribution of
cooperators and defectors (which can be characterized by
different shapes of clusters of cooperators). The resulting
spatial patterns determine assortment between cooperators
and defectors, which directly affects fitness and thus evolu-
tionary dynamics [15-18].
However, currently it is not clear how well these spatial
models apply to species in which individuals are not em-
bedded in static spatial structures in which each individual
has a fixed position and thus a fixed number of interaction
partners. For instance, many social insects and mammals
live in distinct groups where animals disperse among
groups and/or large groups split into several daughter
groups [19-28].
Here we use a simulation approach to study the po-
tential effect of rapid evolution in group living animals
with fixed population sizes and fixed maximum group
sizes. To identify effects of rapid evolution we investi-
gate how assortment of cooperators and defectors and
pay-off differences between cooperators and defectors
depend on the occurrence of evolutionary dynamics.
Specifically we compare two scenarios: (1) a “no selec-
tion” scenario in which cooperation does not affect indi-
vidual fitness, which prevents any effect of evolutionary
dynamics on demographic dynamics and (2) a “selec-
tion” scenario in which cooperation affects individual
fitness, which potentially allows evolutionary dynamicsto affect demographic dynamics. The existence and spe-
cific effects of rapid evolutionary dynamics can be inferred
by comparing the results of both scenarios. Any differ-
ences between scenarios can only be explained by the ex-
istence of rapid evolutionary dynamics.
Methods
Model description
The description of our model is based on the ODD proto-
col for describing individual- and agent-based models [29].
Purpose
The main purpose of this model was to explore whether
and how rapid evolutionary dynamics can affect the evo-
lution of cooperative behaviors if migration rates and
population size is kept constant.
State variables and scales
We assume a population of N haploid, asexually repro-
ducing individuals that live in groups of variable size.
Each individual has one gene that determines whether it
is a cooperator or a defector. In addition, each individ-
ual has fitness F that determines probabilities of death
and reproduction.
Process overview and scheduling
Model dynamics proceed in discrete time steps in which
five processes occur consecutively: (1) interactions among
individuals in a group, which determine individual fitness,
(2) fitness-dependent death, (3) fitness-dependent asexual
reproduction including mutation, (4) individual migration
and (5) splitting of groups that exceed maximum size.
Model details
We assume that in each time step all individuals in a
group interact with each other, which corresponds to the
assumption in spatial models that each individual inter-
acts with all neighbors. To account for differences in
group sizes we assumed that in these interactions coop-
erators pay a total cost c and provide a total benefit b. If
there are nC cooperators in a group with n individuals










Note that these pay-offs also correspond to expected
pay-off in the case where each cooperator engages in
only a single interaction in which a benefit b is provided
to a randomly chosen group member at a cost c.
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is calculated by:
Fi ¼ 1þ s⋅ρi ð3Þ
where s is the coefficient of selection. If there is only a
single individual in a group no interactions occur and
thus these individuals always have a fitness of one.
Death and reproduction are determined by individual
fitness where it is assumed that all individuals in the popu-
lation compete with each other equally (which might arise
when groups have overlapping home ranges and rely on
the same resources). In each time step ten per cent of all
N individuals in the population die. Each time the prob-







where the sum in the denominator includes all individuals
that are still alive. Thus, a greater fitness reduces the prob-
ability of death.
Reproduction compensates for the loss of dying indi-
viduals and thus ensures a constant population size of N.
We simulate reproduction as a sequence of N/10 events
in which each time a single individual is chosen to pro-
duces a single offspring. The probability pr,i that an indi-






where the sum in the denominator includes all alive indi-
viduals excluding newborns. In this case a greater fitness
increases the probability of reproduction. We assume
asexual reproduction in which the offspring inherits the
genome of the parent; and cooperator genes mutate into
selfish genes and vice versa with a probability of 0.001.
After reproduction takes place each individual mi-
grates to another randomly selected group with prob-
ability m. Thereafter groups that exceed a size of nmax
individuals split into two daughter groups. This is imple-
mented by creating a new group with half of all group
members that are selected randomly. Dispersal that oc-
curs through group splitting is often called budding or
propagule dispersal [13,30] and is frequently found in
social mammals and social insects [19-27].
Model analysis
In the model analysis we compared assortment and pay-off
landscapes under scenarios with and without selection. In
each scenario we recorded interaction frequencies and
mean pay-offs of cooperators and defectors for different
frequencies of cooperators and different cost-benefit ratios.In all analyses we assumed a population size N of 100. As a
baseline setting we assumed a maximal group size nmax of
10, an individual migration rate m of 0.02 and no selection
(s = 0). In additional analyses we varied individual migra-
tion rate (m = 0.05) and maximum group size (nmax = 5).
For each parameter setting we additionally explored the
effect of selection (s = 0.5).
For each parameter setting we performed simulations
for different cost-benefit ratios by keeping costs constant
(c = 1) and varying benefits. In different analyses we ad-
justed the investigated range of cost-benefit ratio
to focus on the critical cost-benefit ratio up to which co-
operators gain greater pay-offs than defectors. The ratio
c/b was varied from 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01.
For each parameter combination we performed 500
simulations for 100,000 time steps. All simulations were
initialized with N/nmax groups and nmax individuals per
group. In half of the simulations all initial individuals
were defectors and in the other half all individuals were
cooperators. During simulations we recorded in each
time step (after interactions took place) the frequency of
cooperators in the population, the frequencies with
which cooperators and defectors interact with each other
and the mean pay-offs that cooperators and defectors re-
ceived. Information on pay-offs was used to calculate
differences in mean pay-offs. Assortment was calculated
by subtracting the average frequency with which cooper-
ators interact with other cooperators and the frequency
with which defectors interact with cooperators, which is
consistent with the regression definition of relatedness
in inclusive fitness models [31]. Note that positive values
of this assortment measure mean that cooperators are
more likely to be associated with other cooperators, and
that negative values mean that cooperators are more
likely to be associated with defectors.
Results
No selection scenario
In the absence of selection (s = 0) assortment and thus
pay-off differences between cooperators and defectors are
not frequency dependent, except for extreme frequencies
where assortment drops and cooperators receive smaller
average pay-offs (Figures 1, 2). At very high and very low
frequencies of cooperators assortment is very low. The
reason for this is most apparent in the case in which there
is only a single cooperator in a population of defectors. A
single cooperator cannot interact with other cooperators,
which means that no assortment of cooperators is possible
and therefore a single cooperator also cannot obtain a
greater pay-off than the average defector.
Changes in individual migration rates and maximum
group sizes affected assortment (Figure 1) and therefore
also the critical cost-benefit ratio up to which cooperator
can gain greater average pay-offs than defectors (Figure 2).
Figure 1 Assortment at different cost-benefit ratios and different frequencies of cooperators. Blue areas indicate high positive assortment
and red values indicate low positive assortment between cooperators. (a, b, c) Scenarios without selection (s = 0). (d, e, f) Matching scenarios
with selection (s = 0.5). (g, h, i) Differences in assortment between scenarios with and without selection. (a), (d), (g) Baseline scenario, maximal
group size nmax = 10, individual migration rate m = 0.02. (b, e, h) Increased migration rate (nmax = 10, m = 0.05). (c, f, i) Decreased group size
(nmax = 5, m = 0.02).
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lead to more mixing, which decreases positive assortment
and makes it easier for defectors to exploit cooperators.
Smaller maximum group sizes lead to smaller average
group sizes, which can increase positive assortment be-
cause fewer individuals are affected by migration events.
Selection scenario
In all investigated parameter settings selection markedly
changed model dynamics (Figures 1 and 2). For mostconditions selection led to an increase in positive assort-
ment. As a consequence, the selection scenarios led to
an increase of the critical cost-benefit ratio at which co-
operators gained greater pay-offs than defectors. How-
ever, in particular for low frequencies of cooperators the
opposite effect emerged. Assortment was lower than in
the corresponding no selection scenario, which resulted
in frequency-dependent effects that act against the evo-
lution of cooperation at small frequencies of cooperator.
This frequency-dependent effect widened the adaptive
Figure 2 Differences of mean pay-offs of cooperators and defectors at different cost-benefit ratios and different frequencies of
cooperators. In blue areas cooperators receive greater average pay-offs and in red areas defectors receive greater average pay-offs. (a, b, c)
Scenarios without selection (s = 0). (d, e, f) Matching scenarios with selection (s = 0.5). (a, d) Baseline scenario, maximal group size nmax = 10,
individual migration rate m = 0.02. (b, e) Increased migration rate (nmax = 10, m = 0.05). (c, f) Decreased group size (nmax = 5, m = 0.02).
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in a population of defectors (see Discussion for a more
detailed treatment of the term adaptive valley).
Changes in assortment that occurred due to the pres-
ence of selection indicate the existence of rapid evolution-
ary dynamics. Greater positive assortment can be achieved
by rapid evolution because in mixed groups that contain
cooperators and defectors, cooperators have higher death
and lower reproduction rates than defectors. As shown
in Figure 3, in absence of selection, reproduction and
death processes occur according to the random expect-
ation where cooperators and defectors do not differ in
reproduction and death rates. In presence of selection,
changes in reproduction and death probabilities favor
defectors in within-group selection and cooperators in
between-group selection (Figure 3). For the assumed
coefficient of selection (s = 0.5), changes in reproduction
and death probabilities are rather small, which allows
substantial influence of stochasticity. Nevertheless, in
selection scenarios the frequency of defectors tends to
increase in mixed groups. At the same time, groups with
many cooperators tend to increase in size and fission at
a faster rate compared to groups with few cooperators.These two processes counteract the mixing process that
emerges from migration and thus rapid evolution can
increase positive assortment.
Our finding that rapid evolutionary dynamics widened
the adaptive valley for the evolution of cooperation shows
that rapid evolutionary dynamics do not always increase
positive assortment. At low frequencies of cooperators,
rapid evolutionary dynamics decreased positive assortment
(compare scenarios with and without selection in Figure 1).
This happened because selection acts against the formation
of groups with many cooperators. At low frequencies of
cooperators no or only few groups with many cooperators
exist. In addition, individuals that immigrate into such
groups are likely to be defectors. In absence of selection it
is easily possible that defectors in mixed groups die with-
out reproducing, which increases the frequency of cooper-
ators in such groups. In contrast, when selection takes
place such dynamics are less likely because defectors die
with lower probability than cooperators. In selection sce-
narios, groups with many cooperators often emerge by fis-
sioning. However, this only works well if fissioning can
counterbalance the immigration of defectors. At low fre-
quencies of cooperators, most immigrants are defectors,
Figure 3 Illustration of within-group and between-group selection in absence and presence of selection. In all scenarios we assumed a
population that consists of 10 groups of 10 individuals. For within-group selection (a, b) we varied the proportion of cooperators within groups
while assuming that all groups have the same proportion of cooperators. For between-group selection (c, d) each groups contained either only
cooperators or only defectors and we varied the proportion of cooperator groups. In (a) and (c) we assumed that a single individual reproduces
and calculated the fitness-dependent probability that the reproducing individual is a cooperator. In (b) and (d) we assumed that a single
individual dies and calculated the fitness-dependent probability that the dying individual is a cooperator. In all cases we assumed costs of 1, and
benefits of 2. Circles show results in absence of selection (s = 0). Squares show results in presence of selection (s = 0.5).
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most or all individuals are cooperators.
Additional analyses
Appendix A contains results from additional analyses,
which indicate that the results reported above do not
qualitatively change if (1) fitness affects only death or only
reproduction (Appendix A), (2) the coefficient of selection
is increased to 1 (Appendix A), and (3) mutation rate is
decreased or increased (Appendix A). Additional examples
show how assortment changes with the frequency of
cooperators within single simulation runs (Appendix A).
Appendix B contains the description and analysis of an ex-
tended version of the model in which individuals repro-
duce sexually.
Discussion
Analyses of our model showed that rapid evolution can
crucially influence the evolution of cooperation in group-living individuals even when population size and max-
imum group size is fixed (Figures 1, 2). Rapid evolutionary
dynamics emerge because selection pressures allow evolu-
tionary dynamics to occur on the same timescale as demo-
graphic dynamics. In the “no selection” scenarios birth
and death processes are not influenced by evolutionary dy-
namics and thus cooperators and defectors do not differ
in survival and reproduction rates. In contrast, in the “se-
lection” scenarios evolutionary dynamics directly influence
survival and reproduction rates (Figure 3). This influences
positive assortment, which creates a closed feedback be-
tween evolutionary and demographic dynamics on the
same timescale. Thus, in our model dynamics emerge that
are similar to those that have been observed in spatial
models where individuals are embedded in static spatial
structures in which each individual has a fixed position
and thus a fixed number of interaction partners [15-18].
The increase in positive assortment that occurs in our
model results from rapid evolutionary dynamics. This
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ation models that allow individuals to change their inter-
action partners [32-35]. Such changes can facilitate the
evolution of cooperation when social network dynamics
lead to the preferential formation of connections between
cooperators. This increases positive assortment between
cooperators and defectors, which in turn facilitates the evo-
lution of cooperation. In our model, a preferential associ-
ation of cooperators can also emerge. However, in our
model this association is driven by rapid evolutionary dy-
namics instead of resulting from individual-level decision
rules. Because rapid evolutionary dynamics can generate
similar dynamics as individual-level decision rules, in some
cases such rules might be redundant and rapid evolution
could prevent the evolution of these rules. In particular,
this might happen if the execution of these rules is costly,
e.g. because they require additional cognitive capacities
(see [36] for a similar example in the context of social
learning).
Previous analyses of rapid evolution of cooperation that
assume fixed population sizes often focused on identifying
whether rapid evolution enhances or suppresses the evolu-
tion of cooperation, while potential density dependent-
effects are usually ignored [15-18]. In our analysis we
found that rapid evolution does not always facilitate the
evolution of cooperation. Instead frequency-dependent ef-
fects emerge. This happens because at low frequencies of
cooperators within-group dynamics dominate the impact
of evolution on demographic dynamics. This decreases
positive assortment of cooperators and defectors, which
acts against the evolution of cooperation. In contrast, at
high frequencies of cooperators between-group dynamics
increasingly impact how evolution influences demographic
dynamics. This can result in an increase in positive assort-
ment, which favors the evolution of cooperation. Thus,
rapid evolutionary dynamics can increase positive assort-
ment which facilitates the evolution of cooperation. The ef-
fects of evolution on demographic dynamics in our model
are relatively small (Figure 3), which emphasizes that ef-
fects of selection on reproduction and survival rates do not
have to be extreme in order to critically influence positive
assortment and evolutionary dynamics.
The contrasting dynamics at low and high frequencies
of cooperators lead to frequency-dependent fitness of co-
operators, which creates an adaptive valley for the evolu-
tion of cooperation. This means that for several cost-
benefit ratios cooperators are expected to gain higher
pay-offs than defectors when the frequency of coopera-
tors in the population is already high, but lower pay-offs
are expected when the frequency of cooperators is low.
In this case, when cooperators are rare, selection pres-
sures lead to a decrease in frequency of cooperators (red
areas in Figure 2). In contrast, when cooperators are
more common the direction of selection changes andselection pressures lead to an increase in frequency of
cooperators (blue areas in Figure 2). In other words, in
order to evolve cooperation in a population of defectors
the frequency of cooperators has to increase while selec-
tion initially acts against this increase until a critical
point from which on selection favors cooperation. The
increase in frequency of cooperators might be pictured
as crossing an adaptive valley.
In particular, positive frequency-dependent selection of
cooperative behaviors, which might emerge from rapid
evolution, could be an important explanation for species
differences in cooperative behaviors. Positive frequency-
dependent selection might maintain cooperation in one
species and defection in another species even if both spe-
cies have identical population structures and live in iden-
tical environments (i.e. face the same cost-benefit ratio).
In other words, similar species could be stuck on either
side of an adaptive valley that is created by positive fre-
quency dependence. This would be for instance possible
if an ancestor of one but not the other species managed
to cross this valley. Although crossing adaptive valleys
should be generally unlikely, such events might be
promoted by population expansion [37,38], disturbances
that result in population bottlenecks [39], stochastic
processes [40] or a combination of these and other
processes.
As an example, an adaptive valley might explain differ-
ence in cooperative behaviors in humans and chimpanzees.
Recently, Langergraber et al. [41] showed that humans and
chimpanzees have comparable levels of genetic between-
group differentiation, which contradicts previous argu-
ments that extensive levels of human cooperation are ex-
plained by particularly high genetic differentiation among
human groups [42,43]. Positive frequency-dependent selec-
tion could potentially explain why humans nevertheless
show much more cooperation. At least positive frequency-
dependent selection could explain why differences in
cooperation are maintained and why humans and chimpan-
zees do not converge to similar levels of cooperation.Conclusions
Analyses of our model showed that rapid evolutionary
dynamics can crucially influence the evolution of cooper-
ation in group-living individuals and lead to positive
frequency-dependent selection. The observed dynamics
emerge because selection pressures allow evolutionary
and demographic dynamics and, consequently, also
feedback between assortment and evolution to occur
on the same timescale. In particular, emerging positive
frequency-dependent selection could be an important
explanation for differences in cooperative behaviors
among different species with similar population struc-
tures such as humans and chimpanzees.
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Additional analyses indicate that the results reported in the
main text do not qualitatively change if (1) fitness affects
only death or only reproduction (Figure 4), (2) the coeffi-
cient of selection is increased to 1 (Figure 5), and (3) mu-
tation rate is decreased or increased (Figure 6). Figure 7
contains examples that show how assortment changes
with the frequency of cooperators within single simulation
runs.
Appendix B: Sexual reproduction model
We extended the model described in the main text to
explore the influence of sexual reproduction. We now
assume a population of diploid organisms, Nf females
and Nm males. Each time step Nf/10 females and Nm/10
males die and then Nf/10 females and Nm/10 males are
born. During reproduction an individual inherits one al-
lele from the father and one from the mother. Heterozy-
gous individuals become cooperators with 50% chance
(i.e. one of the two alleles is silenced randomly). Fe-
males are assumed to be philopatric and thus onlyFigure 4 Fitness affects only death or reproduction. Assortment at diffe
baseline scenario (nmax= 10, m= 0.02). (a) No selection (s= 0). (b) Fitness affects
affects only reproduction (s= 0.5).disperse by group fissioning but not individually. Fis-
sioning is implemented as described in the main text.
However, now only the number of females in a group
determines whether a group splits. We also focus on co-
operation among females and thus assume that only fe-
males interact with each other. Thus only females gain
fitness as described in the main text and only female
death and reproduction is fitness-dependent. Males do
not interact with each other and thus all have the same
fitness. Therefore also death and reproduction of males
occurs randomly. In addition, males are assumed to re-
peatedly migrate individually. However, migration is not
explicitly modeled. Instead each time a females repro-
duces one randomly selected male is assumed to be the
father (which implicitly assumed a high individual mi-
gration rate of males).
In the analysis of the sexual reproduction model we set
the number of females Nf and males Nm to 100, the max-
imum females groups size nmax to 5. Again we contrasted
a scenario without selection (s = 0) to a scenario with se-
lection (s = 0.5).rent cost-benefit ratios and different frequencies of cooperators in the
birth and death (s= 0.5). (c) Fitness affects only death (s= 0.5). (d) Fitness
Figure 5 Changes in the coefficient of selection s. Assortment at different cost-benefit ratios and different frequencies of cooperators in the
baseline scenario (nmax = 10, m = 0.02) with s = 0 (a), s = 0.5 (b) and s = 1 (c).
Figure 6 Changes in mutation probabilities. Assortment at different cost-benefit ratios and different frequencies of cooperators in the baseline
scenario (nmax = 10, m = 0.02) with mutation probability set to 0.000001 (a), 0.0001 (b) and 0.01 (c).
Figure 7 Examples of how assortment changes with the frequency of cooperators within single simulation runs. (a) Baseline scenario
without selection (s = 0). (b) Baseline scenario with selection (s = 0.5). In both cases cost-benefit ratios were set to 0.5, simulations were initialized
with a population of defectors and depicted dynamics comprise 25,000 simulated time steps.
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Figure 8 Differences of mean pay-offs of cooperators and defectors and assortment in the sexual reproduction model. (a, c) In blue
areas cooperators receive greater average pay-offs and in red areas defectors receive greater average pay-offs. (b, d) Blue areas indicate high
positive assortment and red values indicate low positive assortment cooperators. (a, b) Scenario without selection (s = 0). (c, d) Scenarios with
selection (s = 0.5). Note that results are shown only for cost-benefit ratios up to 0.6.
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similar results to those found in the asexual model
(Figure 8). However, in the sexual reproduction model
a much broader adaptive valley emerged. This hap-
pened because reproduction is directly connected to
male migration. At low frequencies of cooperators
most males carry one or two defector alleles. In this
case, males introduce defector alleles into cooperator
groups, which increases mixing of cooperator and de-
fectors. Thus, compared to the asexual model it is
much more difficult to maintain groups with many
cooperators when the frequency of cooperators is
low. The situation is very different at high frequencies
of cooperators when males are more likely to carry
cooperator alleles. In this case, it is less likely that
males introduce defector alleles into cooperator
groups. This makes it more likely that these groupsgrow and fission, which leads to an elevated level of
positive assortment.
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